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We analyze unique data that identify whether individuals have participated in 
decentralized wage setting and whether they have negotiated their own wages. 
Wages are significantly higher for those who have been part of a formalized wage-
setting process compared with non-participants, but only in the public sector. 
Employees who negotiate their own wages have higher wages than non-
negotiators. Wages are also significantly higher for those who negotiate with a 
manager who has the power to set wages, compared with those who negotiate with 
a manager who has no power over wages. This concerns employees in the public 
and the private sectors. Quantile regression results reveal that the outcome of 
individual bargaining increases over the wage distribution. Percentile wage 
differences are significant only among workers who negotiate with a manager who 
has the power to set wages. Estimated wage differences between negotiators and 
non-negotiators are 4.6% on average, 5.6% in the 90th percentile, and 2.3% at the 
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1. Introduction 
In most economies, wages are the outcome of negotiations between either 
unions and employer organizations at various levels, or between the 
individual and the employer at the local level. There are many studies of the 
effects of unions on wages and employment, as well as cross-country 
analyses of the macroeconomic effects of different wage-setting systems.1 
There is also a large body of literature on bargaining and contract theory, 
which provides important insights into the determinants of bargaining 
outcomes2. In contrast, there are few empirical studies of the actual outcome 
of individual wage bargaining.3 
In this study, we exploit unique union data on professionals to analyze 
the outcome of decentralized wage formation. These data identify whether 
individuals have negotiated their own wages, and if they have negotiated 
with a manager who has the power to set wages or with one who does not. 
This information allows us to investigate whether wages vary between 
employees within an organized local wage-setting system and non-
participants, and between individuals who negotiate their own wages and 
those who do not. Moreover, we can measure the impact of managerial 
power on individual wages. An important aspect of the study is that it adds 
information to traditional wage equations, which are usually not observed in 
analyses of individual wages. 
Empirical results indicate that wage inequality is greater in a 
decentralized than in a centralized wage-setting system (Katz & Autor, 
1999). If this observation also applies when a strong egalitarian system 
becomes more individualistic, we would expect wages to vary between 
workers with varying influences over their own wages. This suggests that 
                                                 
1 Booth (1995) and Addison & Schnabel (2002) include theoretical and empirical overviews 
of the trade union literature. See Katz & Autor (1999) for studies of the effects of wage-
setting systems.  
2 Muthoo (1999) discusses the central aspects of bargaining theory. Salanié (1997) and 
Bolton & Dewatripont (2005) present the core ideas of contract theory. 
3 There is one study of gender differences in individual wage bargaining (Säve-Söderbergh 
(2003).   3
the variables on individual bargaining exploited in this study may be used 
to examine the impact of decentralized bargaining on individual wages. 
During the 1990s, the wage-setting system for professionals in Sweden 
changed from one where wages were set at industry level to one where 
wages were set at the firm level.
4 Industry-level agreements structure the 
local wage-formation process, one important component of these agreements 
being the pay review model. In this model, employees meet their manager 
regularly and discuss individual performance, and eventually agree on a 
new wage. This model may be considered to be an institutionalized form of 
local wage bargaining.  
The results of this study show that monthly wages are 2% higher for 
employees who participate in the pay review process, compared with non-
participants. The wage differential is 1% in the private sector, 2% in the 
municipality sector and insignificant in the state sector. Quantile regression 
results show that the outcome of participation decreases over the wage 
distribution. Individuals who negotiate their own wages have significantly 
higher wages than non-negotiators. The wage effect of negotiations is 
significantly larger for those who negotiate with a manager who has the 
power to set wages. The monthly wage differential is 4.7% in the private 
sector, 4.3% in the municipality sector and 2.6% in the state sector. Quantile 
regression results reveal that the outcome of individual bargaining 
increases significantly over the wage distribution.  
In this article, section 2 gives a brief institutional background. Section 3 
sets the empirical framework for the data used for this study, which is given 
in section 4. Section 5 reports the empirical findings, followed by some 
concluding remarks in section 6. 
 
                                                 
4 Calmfors, Booth, Burda, Checchi, Naylor and Visser (2001) show that there has been an 
increasing tendency toward decentralized wage setting in many European countries during 
the 1990s.   4
2. Institutional background 
Sweden has three confederations of unions. Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation (LO) is the central organization for 16 unions, organizing 1.9 
million manual workers. Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees 
(TCO) has 18 affiliated unions and 1.3 million members, all of whom are 
qualified employees. Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations 
(SACO) is a confederation of 25 independent unions, with about 550,000 
members, all of whom are academics or professionals with a college or 
university degree. In this study, we analyze individuals who are members of 
associations in SACO. This is because these unions were the first to adopt 
decentralized wage formation, and they have collected data that can be used 
to analyze the individual outcomes of local wage formation. 
In the 1970s, SACO and the employer organizations signed non-
binding central agreements on wages. These agreements set the framework 
for industry level wage bargaining. Since the 1980s, agreements are made 
at the industry level, between each employer organization and the unions 
that organize employees within that industry. In the public sector, unions 
have formed cartels that conduct the bargaining. In the private sector, each 
union negotiates with the employers within the industry.  
In the late 1990s, unions and employers reached agreements at the 
industry level about the framework for wage bargaining at the local level. 
These agreements provided a set of rules for the local bargaining process 
and stated how the bargaining process should continue in cases when 
representatives at the local level could not reach an agreement.  
The most recent industry-level agreements include only general 
guidelines about wage formation. Some unions have signed contracts, giving 
little room for individual bargaining, while others have agreed that all 
wages should be set through local wage bargaining. To get an overview of 
the formal structure of wage-setting systems, we classified all current 
agreements into four general classes. Table 1 presents the results, which 
show that wages for all employed members are set through some form of   5
local bargaining.5 The first class of agreements comprises nearly 60% of the 
employed members. They are covered by industry-level agreements, which 
stipulate that wages should be set at the local level and with no guaranteed 
wage changes. These agreements are common in the public and private 
sectors. 
 
  <TABLE 1 About here> 
 
The second class of industry-level agreements states the size of the wage 
margin, and it applies if the union and the employer cannot reach an 
agreement at the local level. At the local level, the union and the employer 
bargain about the size of the wage margin and the distribution of the 
margin. There are no individual guarantees, which means that low-
performing individuals covered by these agreements are at risk of getting no 
wage increase. These agreements cover about 21% of the employed 
members. 
The third group of agreements covers 3% of the members, and includes 
information about the size of the margin and guarantees for individual wage 
increases. But unions and employers at the local level are allowed to 
bargain over the margin. Unions must accept the industry-level agreement 
only when they fail to reach a local agreement.  
The last group of agreements covers 18% of the employed members, 
and includes information about the level of the wage margin. In this case, 
local unions and employers negotiate about the distribution of the wage 
margin.  
Even if the industry-level agreements do not state wage margins, they 
all include statements about the role of wages and the factors that should 
affect individual wages. These statements show that unions and employers 
tend to argue in terms of efficiency wage theories. For example, most 
                                                 
5 The National Mediation Office indicates that wages for most Swedish workers are 
completely or partly set at the local level (Medlingsinstitutet 2002).   6
agreements state that wages should be used to create work incentives and 
that there should be a relationship between wages and performance.  
Some industry-level agreements also organize the local wage-bargaining 
process, through a structure called the pay review model. This model 
implies that the individual and the manager meet regularly to discuss 
individual performance and eventually agree on a new wage. As per the 
agreements, employers must speak with employees before they set the 
wages. That is, the pay review model implies that the worker and the 
employer are involved in an organized form of local wage bargaining.6 If the 
local union and the employer agree not to use the pay review model, wages 
are set in traditional local bargaining processes between the union 
representative and the employer.  
The pay review model was developed to structure the local wage 
bargaining process, and the union and the employer  support the model’s 
concepts. The model can be considered to be an institutionalized form of 
decentralized wage formation. Local union representatives know when the 
pay review talks are being held, which gives them opportunities to prepare 
employees for wage talks. Unions might also inform employees about 
bargaining strategies. The model has been formally used for the first time 
during the agreements covered by our data.  
 
3. Empirical considerations  
As a starting point, we analyze the relationship between the review process 
and log monthly wages. Consider this wage equation: 
 
it it i it X D Y 1 2 1 1 0 ε β β β + + + = , 1 
 
                                                 
6 It is possible that managers may have determined the wage level before the review talks, 
and only report the new wage when they meet the employee. Even so, they still have to 
motivate the wage, which means that they have evaluated the worker’s relative 
performance.    7
where Yit is the log of monthly wages for individual i at time t; Di1 is a 
dummy variable that indicates if the individual has participated in the 
review process; Xit is a vector of individual characteristics; and ε1it is a 
random error. The coefficient on Di1,  β1 represents the impact of 
participating in the review process in time t. This is the parameter of 
interest in the first analysis.  
The pay review variable is a new variable in individual wage 
equations, and it captures aspects of individual wage formation, which were 
not observed in previous studies. Another interesting aspect of this variable 
is that it can be interpreted in terms of efficiency wage theories. For 
example, the employer might talk with only the most productive workers 
and give them higher wages than others, because she wants them to stay in 
the firm. The employer might also give employees who are part of the 
review process higher wages, to increase their loyalty to the firm and their 
performance. This implies that we should expect more productive workers 
to participate in the review talks, i.e. β1  >0. If employers talk with only the 
least productive workers, β1  < 0.  
We then estimate the outcome of individual bargaining, which is 
expected to depend on the manager’s power over wage decisions. The wage 
equation is 
 
it it i i it X D D Y 2 4 3 3 2 2 0 ε β β β β + + + + =    2 
 
where Di2 is 1 if employees have negotiated with a manager who does not 
have the power to set wages, Di3 is 1 if employees have negotiated with a 
manager who has the power to set wages, and they are 0 if employees have 
not negotiated their own wages. The coefficients β2   and β3  represent the 
impact of individual wage bargaining and are the parameters of interest.  
Various factors affect the outcome of bargaining. Bargaining theory 
suggests two general classes of factors: inside options (which in our case 
might be career possibilities and individual performance) and outside   8
options (e.g., job offers). Employers’ inside options might be the firm’s 
financial situation, other internal job candidates etc., while their outside 
options might be the likelihood of finding equally good external job 
candidates. These expectations lead to a final wage, which is the wage that 
the individual worker accepts and the outcome that we observe. The 
outcome of the bargaining process varies among employees, since employees 
at various positions have different inside and outside options. These 
differences are likely to affect employers' decisions about the distribuation 
of wages.  
The grouping of employees into negotiators and non-negotiators is 
affected by observed and unobserved characteristics. It can be assumed that 
negotiators, on average, share similar unobserved characteristics, i.e., 
differences in unobserved individual productivity must be smaller between 
groups of negotiators than between the groups of negotiators and non-
negotiators. So comparing negotiators alone does not suffer from the same 
degree of selection bias as comparing negotiators with non-negotiators. 
Consequently, our estimates of the outcomes of individual bargaining with 
managers, who have different powers over wage setting, are not due to 
unobserved individual differences between negotiators. Rather, the 
estimated outcomes are due to differences between managers; these 
differences are either observed by their power over wage setting, or 
unobserved.  
If individuals who negotiate are considered to be more productive than 
those who do not negotiate, negotiators will have higher wages than non-
negotiators, β2  > 0  and  β3 > 0. If employers only bargain with those who are 
at risk of receiving wage cuts or being laid off, β2  < 0  and  β3 <  0.  The sign 
might also be negative if non-negotiators are represented by a professional 
negotiator from the union, or if those who negotiate themselves are poor 
negotiators.  
The size of the coefficients might vary. Managers with no power to set 
wages must discuss wages with other managers. The situation can be   9
compared with one in which a union negotiates for a group of workers, and 
in such a situation more/less productive workers tend to receive wages 
below/above their productivity7. This suggests that β2  > β3 .  
Employers’ views on wage dispersion are also key for the outcome of 
individual bargaining. Levine (1991) argues that a compressed wage 
structure promotes cohesiveness, which makes firms willing to pay high 
wages even for less productive workers. Akerlof & Yellen (1991) argue that a 
compressed wage structure creates a positive working environment and 
improves productivity. This suggests that bargaining solutions might be 
independent of managers’ power over wages. But Lazear (1995) argues that 
an increase of the wage dispersion has beneficial effects on individual 
productivity. If only managers who are allowed to set wages believe in the 
productivity effect, then the bargaining outcome will depend on the 
managers’ power over wages.  
In the third analysis, we use quantile regression8 to examine 
heterogeneity in the outcome of the pay review process and individual 
bargaining. We estimate the θth  percentile of log monthly wages (yi) 
conditional on individual characteristics (xi) and our indicators of 
decentralized wage formation (Di1, Di2 and Di3). It is assumed that qθ , which 
is the value of yi conditional on xi, Di1, Di2 and Di3 in percentile θ is linear in 
the right-hand-side variables. We estimate this equation:  
 
i i i D X y q θ θ θ θ θ ε β β β + + + = 2 1 0 ) (  (3) 
 
where  D represents all indicators of decentralized wage formation. The 
estimated coefficients are interpreted as the impact in percentile θ  of the 
wage distribution. This method is robust to outliers on the dependent 
variable. It assumes that the standard errors are homoskedastic. In our 
                                                 
7 Empirical results indicate that earnings inequality is lower in centralized wage-setting 
systems than in decentralized wage-setting systems (Blau & Kahn 1996).  
8 See, e.g., Koenker & Basett (1974) and Buchinsky (1994).   10
application, this assumption is not fulfilled, and we estimate bootstrapped 
standard errors to adjust for the problem. We estimate the full covariance 
matrix of the estimators, including between-percentile blocks, which allows 
us to perform cross-percentile tests. In particular, we investigate whether 




The data come from the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations 
(SACO), and were collected through annual surveys of members. Each 
association within SACO conducts the survey, but the data are compiled by 
administrators at SACO. Unions use the data, e.g. to analyze wages and 
provide members with accurate information about wage levels among 
professionals.  
The data were collected in 2002, which was the first year that a large 
sample of members was surveyed about decentralized wage formation. 
Seventeen out of 26 unions conducted a survey in 2002, and these unions 
represent about 50% of all employed members (but these unions represent 
75% of the members in the private sector)9. We extracted two samples 
containing 97,810 and 11,448 individuals. The large sample (SAMPLE 1) 
includes individuals who answered questions about the pay review process, 
and the small sample (SAMPLE 2) includes individuals who also answered 
questions about managers’ power over wage setting. The samples are 
analyzed separately.  
Table 2a reports basic information about the sample used to analyze 
the outcome of the pay review process. Column one presents mean values for 
the complete sample, while columns two and three present mean sample 
characteristics of individuals who have participated in pay review talks (pay 
review=1), and individuals who have not participated in review talks (pay 
                                                 
9 About 140,000 individuals answered the questionnaire, which is a 70% response rate.   11
review=0), respectively. The table also includes results of tests of equal 
means and proportions in the samples of participants and non-participants. 
 
< TABLE 2a About here > 
 
The average monthly wage10 is SEK  32,400 (about EUR  3,377, exchange 
rate SEK  9.6/EUR  1). Due to the survey sampling design, most of the 
individuals included in the analyses work in the private sector (60%), while 
only 17% work in the municipality sector. About 60% have participated in a 
pay review process.  
A college degree is required for union membership, which means that 
the union variable correlates strongly with formal education and profession. 
Notably, there are many engineers. Other large groups are individuals in 
Jusek, the Association of Graduates in Law, Business Administration and 
Economics, Computer and Systems Science, Personnel Management and 
Social Science (27.7%), and Civek, the Association of Graduates in Business 
Administration and Economics (10.9%). 
Significant differences exist between participants in the pay review 
process and non-participants. Participants have fewer years of experience, 
work largely in the private sector, and have an educational background in 
engineering. There are also significantly more men among participants. The 
empirical analyses control for these differences, and we run separate 
regressions for each sector.  
Table 2b reports mean sample characteristics of the bargaining sample. 
Column one presents the overall means, while the other columns report 
means for non-bargainers, individuals who have bargained with a manager 
who has no power to set wages, and individuals who have bargained with 
managers who has power over wages.  
 
                                                 
10 Full-time equivalents, including 1/12 of the calculated value of bonuses, provisions and 
fringe benefits.   12
< TABLE 2b About here > 
 
Most of the individuals work in the public sector (60% in the municipal 
sector and 22% in the state sector). The reason is that only four unions have 
asked questions about manager´ powers over wages, and these unions 
organize many workers in the public sector. The public sector is also the 
primary employer of women, which explains the large share of women in 
sample 2. Almost 31% of the sample population has negotiated their own 
wage. About 22% has bargained with a manager who has the power to set 
wages, and 8% with a manager who is not allowed to set wages.11  
There are significantly greater numbers of employees from the private 
and municipality sectors among negotiators than non-negotiators. There are 
also significant occupational differences between the groups. The empirical 
analyses control for these differences, and we run sector-specific regressions 
also for this sample.  
 
5. Empirical findings 
The pay review process 
Employees in the private sector have longer experience of local wage setting 
than employees in the public sector. The experience might also vary among 
employers in the two sectors. Moreover, the content of the industry-level 
agreements, which provide the framework for the local barging process, can 
vary between sectors. These differences further motivate separate analyses 
of employees in the private and public sectors.  
Table 3 reports estimated wage differences between college-educated 
employees in the private sector who have discussed wages with their 
manager, and employees who have not discussed wages. Column one reports 
the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, and columns P10-P90 
report the percentile regression estimates.  
                                                 
11 Among negotiators, 73% have negotiated with a manager who has the power to set wages 
and 27% with one who has no power over wages.   13
 
  <TABLE 3 About here > 
 
The estimates of the pay review variable suggest that wage levels vary 
among employees who have discussed wages with a manager and those who 
have not discussed wages. As per the OLS estimate, the wage difference is 
about 1%, which is based on the average wages for sample 1, and amounts 
to about EUR 410 per year. Percentile estimates below the 50th percentile 
are higher than the OLS estimate, while estimates above the 50th percentile 
are lower. The effect of participation in the pay review process decreases 
over the wage distribution and becomes negative at the top. This suggests 
that employees at low-paid positions benefit from the wage talks, while 
employees at higher-paid positions do not benefit.12 Obviously, the pay 
review variable captures aspects of local wage formation, which are 
important for individual wages.  
On average, there are no significant wage differences between 
participants in the pay review process and non-participants, in the state 
sector. But the percentile regression estimates show that there are 
significant wage differences between participants and non-participants up 
to the 60th percentile. At most, there is a monthly wage differential of 2.6%. 
As in the private sector, the estimated wage differences decrease over the 
wage distribution. There are no significant effects of participation in the pay 
review process at the top of the wage distribution.13  
The wage difference between participants in the pay review process 
and non-participants is greatest in the municipality sector. The OLS 
estimates show that the wage differences are 2.1%, compared with 1% in the 
private sector. This is due to the significant wage differences in the top part 
                                                 
12 Cross-percentile tests reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients in p10 versus p50 and in 
p50 versus p90 (F-values are 40.21 and 46.64). 
13 The cross-percentile test does not reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients in p10 versus 
p50 (F-value is 1.62), but it rejects the hypothesis of equal coefficients in p50 versus p90 (F-
value is 25.98).   14
of the distribution. In the lower part of the distribution, the results are 
similar in the private and municipality sectors but higher in the state 
sector. Moreover, the estimated wage differences do not fall much over the 
wage distribution in the municipality sector.14  
There is a gender wage gap in all sectors, but it is larger in the private 
sector. In the private and municipality sectors, the gender wage gap 
increases significantly over the wage distribution, which suggests that there 
might be a glass ceiling for professional women. The returns to experience is 
lowest in the municipality sector and highest in the private sector, while the 
impact of the pay review variable is higher in the municipality sector than 
in the private sector. This might suggest that traditional factors, such as 
experience, are less important than other individual characteristics, which 
can be rewarded when wages are set at the local level.  
 
Individual bargaining 
Table 4 reports the estimated outcomes of individual bargaining and the 
returns to the basic individual characteristics for employees in the private 
and public sectors. There are two bargaining estimates, one for individuals 
who have negotiated with a manager who is not allowed to set wages, and 
another for individuals who have negotiated with a manager who has the 
power to set wages. The comparison group has either had a union 
representative negotiating for them or belongs to a group of employees who 
have not been given the option to bargain over their wages. Both bargainers 
and non-bargainers are union members.  
 
< TABLE 4 About here > 
 
Significant wage differences exist between employees who negotiate their 
own wages with a manager who has the power to set wages and non-
                                                 
14 Cross-percentile tests do not reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients in p10 versus p50 
and in p50 versus p90 (F-values are 3.07 and 0.61).   15
negotiators in the private sector. The wage differential is 4.7%, which 
amounts to EUR 111 per month based on the average wages for sample 2. 
50 
The wage differences vary somewhat over the distribution.15 The OLS 
estimate of the effects of bargaining with a manager who is not allowed to 
set wages is not significantly different from zero. The effects vary over the 
wage distribution, and there are significant differences between p20-p60. At 
most, the wage difference is 3.8%.  
Wages vary significantly between employees who negotiate with a 
manager who is allowed to set wages and non-negotiators in the state 
sector. The level of the estimate is lower than the estimate in the private 
sector, while there is no major variation over the wage distribution in the 
state sector. The cross-percentile tests do not reject the hypothesis of equal 
coefficients. 
There are significant differences between negotiators and non-
negotiators in the municipality sector. The OLS estimate is about 1% for 
employees who negotiate with a manager who lacks the power over wages, 
and 4% for those who negotiate with a manager who has the power to set 
wages. The wage distribution varies considerably among individuals who 
negotiated with a manager who has the power to set wages –1.7%  in p20 
and as much as 7.3% in p90. The estimates also increase over the 
distribution for those who negotiated with a manager who lacks power over 
wages, 0.7% in p30 and 2.2% in p90.16 One explanation for this pattern 
might be that employees in the top part of the distribution are more able 
negotiators. They might, for example, have positions in which they regularly 
negotiate on various organizational matters. They might also be more 
experienced in general. In all, the variables capture either the impact of 
individual bargaining or differences in worker characteristics. Even so, the 
results clearly show that the variables capture aspects of local wage 
                                                 
15 The cross-percentile tests do not reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients. 
16 Cross-percentile tests reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients in p10 versus p50 and in 
p50 versus p90 (F-values are 15.14 and 44.21).   16
formation that affect individual wages, and these factors are usually not 
observed in studies of individual wages.  
 
6. Concluding remarks  
The results in this study show that wages for participants in the pay review 
process are significantly higher than wages for non-participants. If 
employers act according to efficiency wage theories, they discuss wages only 
with the most productive employees. This might, in turn, suggest that 
productive workers benefit more than less productive workers from a system 
of decentralized wage setting.  
The percentile regression results indicate that the wage differences 
among participants and non-participants in the pay review process are 
larger at the bottom of the wage distribution than at the top. This suggests 
that employees who has low wages benefit more from the pay review process 
than employees who has high wages. This might indicate that Swedish 
employers focus on low wage workers also within a decentralized wage 
setting system. But the results also show that the variable captures 
important aspects of individual wages that are usually not observed. If the 
variables correlate with individual unobservables, the results suggest that 
within a system of decentralized wage formation, non-traditional individual 
characteristics are important determinants of individual wages.  
The results also show that individuals who negotiate their own wages 
have significantly higher wages than those who do not negotiate. The wage 
differences are greater for those who negotiate with a manager who has the 
power to set wages. The quantile regression results demonstrate that wage 
differences due to bargaining increase over the wage distribution. This 
might suggest that employees at the top of the wage distribution benefit the 
most from individual wage bargaining. 
   17
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Table 1 Agreement models among the unions within SACO and the number 
and percentage of members covered by each model, 2002. 
AGREEMENT MODEL  Number of 
members 
% 
1. Local wage formation without nationally 
determined wage margin 
208,000 57   
2. Local wage formation with a cut-off regulating 
the size of the margin. No guarantees of individual 
wage margins.  
78,000 21   
3. Local wage formation with a cut-off regulating 
the size of the margin. Guarantees of individual 
wage margins.  
11,000 3 
4. Local wage formation. Bargaining about the 
distribution of wage margin decided at the industry 
level. 
67,000 18   
TOTAL  364,000 100   
NOTE:  Students, self employed, members of more than one union and members in 
firms, who have not signed collective agreements, are not included. 
   19
Table 2a Mean sample characteristics, pay review. 
















% women  43.7  40.8  48.1** 
% private sector  59.6  66.1  50.1** 
% state sector  23.3  18.7  30.3** 
% municipality sector  17.0  15.2  19.7** 
% managers  21.5  22.0  20.7** 
Distribution of individuals by unions, %        
Business Administration and economics, 
Civek 
10.9 10.4  11.7** 
Graduate engineers, CF  41.6  46.4  34.5** 
Law, Computer and Systems Science, Jusek  27.7  27.9  27.5** 
Teachers, LR  0.4  0.4  0.4 
Social science, personnel, public 
administration, SSR 
1.9 2.0  1.8** 
Physiotherapists, LSR  5.6  4.4  7.3** 
Occupational Therapists, FSA  3.3  2.7  4.3** 
Documentation, Information and Culture, 
DIK 
4.7 3.2  6.9** 
Scientists, NATVET  3.8  2.6  5.6** 
Numbers of individuals   97 810  58 340  39 470 
NOTE:  Standard deviations are in parentheses. Experience is number of years since 
college graduation. * equality of means is rejected at the 5% level. ** equality of 
proportions is rejected at the 5% level. 
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Table 2b Mean sample characteristics, bargaining. 
VARIABLES SAMPLE  II  No 
bargaining 
Manager has 
no power to 
set wages 
Manager has 
power to set 
wages 
monthly wages  22 788  
(5 608) 
22 678  
(5 388) 
21 796  
(4 540) 
23 507  
(6 489) 
years of experience  14.7 (10.3)  15.4 (10.3)*  11.3 (9.8)  13.8 (10.4) 
%  women  77.7 77.8 78.2 77.5 
% private sector  17.6 13.2**  16.5 31.4 
% state sector  22.0  27.1**  17.0  8.2 
% municipality sector  60.4  59.7**  66.5  60.4 
% managers  12.4  10.8  5.2  12.8 
Distribution of individuals 
by unions, %  
    
Physiotherapists, LSR  34.2  25.9**  38.2  58.1 
Occupational Therapists, 
FSA 
19.8  22.1** 23.5  11.5 
Documentation, 
Information and Culture, 
DIK 
25.2 
29.0** 19.6  15.7 
 
Scientists, NATVET  20.8 22.9**  18.6 14.8 
Number of individuals   11 448  7 914  973  2 561 
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Experience is number of years since college 
graduation. * equal means of non-negotiators and negotiators is rejected at the 5% level. ** 
equal proportions of non-negotiators and negotiators is rejected at the 5% level. 
 Table 3 The impact of pay review talks in different parts of the wage distribution in the private sector, state 
and municipality sectors. Simultaneous quantile regression.  
  OLS  P10 P20 P30 P40 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90 
  PRIVATE SECTOR 




































































































6.  Union  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
# individuals  58 336  58 336  58 336  58 336  58 336  58 336  58 336  58 336  58 336  58 336 
R2 0.504  0.278 0.314 0.335 0.345 0.347 0.344 0.337 0.328 0.320 
  STATE SECTOR 




































































































6.  Union  yes yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
# individuals  22 831  22 831  22 831  22 831  22 831  22 831  22 831  22 831  22 831  22 831 
R2 0.504#  0.253 0.299 0.321 0.332 0.339 0.344 0.351 0.359 0.359   22 
TABLE 3 Continued 
 MUNICIPALITY  SECTOR 


























































































6. Union    yes  yes  yes  yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
# individuals    16 643  16 643  16 643  16 643  16 643  16 643  16 643  16 643  16 643 
R2   0.241  0.311  0.360  0.404  0.441 0.474 0.499 0.516 0.521 
** statistically significant at the 1% level,  * statistically significant at the 5% level. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4 The outcome of individual wage bargaining in different parts of the wage distribution in the private, 
state and municipality sectors. Simultaneous quantile regression.  
  OLS  P10 P20 P30 P40 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90 
        PRIVATE SECTOR     
1a. No power 



























































































































6. Union  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
#  individuals  2012  2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 
R2  0.493  0.209 0.247 0.280 0.300 0.317 0.336 0.351 0.361 0.373 
 STATE  SECTOR 
1a. No power 
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Table 4 continued 
6. Union  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
# individuals  2 517  2 517  2 517  2 517  2 517  2 517  2 517  2 517  2 517  2 517 
R2 0.493  0.230 0.255 0.276 0.290 0.299 0.306 0.310 0.315 0.314 
 MUNICIPALITY  SECTOR 
1a. No 




























































































































6. Union  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
# individuals  6 919  6 919  6 919  6 919  6 919  6 919  6 919  6 919  6 919  6 919 
R2 0.463  0.195 0.222 0.242 0.255 0.270 0.287 0.306 0.334 0.370 
** statistically significant at the 1% level, * statistically significant at the 5% level. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. Exp 
is years of work experience. 
 
 
 